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Summary Overview
North Korea’s attempt to launch a satellite 
into earth orbit failed for the fourth time on 
April 12 2012. 
Details of what happened are still not fully 
clear. From the limited evidence released to the 
public the failure happened close to the end of 
the first stage burnout though the information 
put out by North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD) and South Korea differ to 
some extent.
The announcement by North Korea of the 
imminent launch and its notification of the areas 
of impact of the spent first and second stages 
triggered widespread international condemnation 
especially from the US. In their view the space 
launch is a clever ruse by North Korea for acquiring 
long range missile capability under an ostensible 
noble civilian peaceful purpose.
The imminent launch also saw the 
publication of many articles and reviews about 
North Korea’s missile and space launchers. These 
drew upon earlier work that many of them had 
done on the space and missile capabilities of 
North Korea. These also had the benefit of a 
more transparent North Korea which allowed 
the international press access to the launch site 
and allowed limited video coverage.
At NIAS we thought it a worthwhile 
exercise to track the North Korean launch effort 
and if possible make some predictions about 
the launch. Though the launch has failed we 
thought it necessary to put out our work in the 
public domain. This report is the outcome of 
our work and is based on the assumption that 
if the North Koreans had been successful what 
kind of capability would they have created. 
Using images of the Unha 2 and Unha 
3 launchers available in the public domain 
we were able to make measurements on the 
different components of the missile. Using the 
diameter and lengths obtained from these we 
were able to translate them into propellant and 
structural masses. Using other publicly available 
information on North Korea’s missile and space 
programmes and some expert knowledge 
available with rocket engineers and designers 
we could derive the necessary launch vehicle 
parameters for running a trajectory model 
developed at NIAS.
The notifications of the impact zones for 
the first and second stages put out by North 
Korea helped us anchor our trajectory model 
more realistically to the first and second stage 
cutoff velocities and locations of the missile. 
Through a process of iteration we were able 
to alter the missile parameters obtained from 
the images with the shaping of a trajectory that 
fitted well with the notified impact zones for 
the first and second stage respectively. A launch 
azimuth of 171 degrees and an initial pitch 
angle of 89.2 degrees provided a reasonable fit 
with the first and second stage impact zones. 
To achieve this fit some additional weight had 
to be added to our derived baseline third stage 
and some marginal changes were also needed 
for the second stage.
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Using this iterated and improved baseline 
that fitted with the impact zones of the first 
and second stages we then went to shape 
the trajectory of the third stage. To achieve 
the intended 500 km orbit it is necessary to 
carry out a maneuver after the burnout of the 
second stage. After this the third stage satellite 
combination has to coast for a certain time 
before the third stage rocket motor is ignited. 
This firing has to happen close to an altitude of 
500 km and should take place when the local 
velocity vector is perpendicular to the radius 
vector of the third stage. Through a process of 
iteration once again we were able to inject the 
third stage with the satellite into an orbit of 506 
km perigee and 638 km apogee. The achieved 
orbit has an inclination of 87.050 degrees and a 
period of 95.93 minutes.
Though the achieved orbit is not perfectly 
circular it is reasonably close to the set of possible 
orbits that North Korea could have achieved if 
the launch had been successful. The degree to 
which an achieved orbit matches the parameters 
of a perfect 500 km circular orbit would give us 
an idea of North Korean capabilities in mastering 
the technology of a precise orbit injection to 
achieve a desired orbit.
The Keplerian orbital elements that are 
based on a non-rotating earth centered inertial 
frame of reference have also been derived 
from the propagation of our trajectory model. 
For different points in the orbit these orbital 
elements are relatively constant as they should 
be.
Some of the key parameters of the achieved 
orbit are provided below.




Eccentricity of the orbit “e” 0.0095
Apogee of orbit 638 Km
Perigee of orbit 506 Km
Inclination of the orbit “i” 87.050 
Period of the satellite 95.93 minutes
Since the space launch vehicle can also 
be used as a missile we also studied the range 
that could be achieved by the Unha 3 if it is 
used as a ballistic missile with a standard 1000 
kg nuclear payload. The ranges for different 
launch directions vary from a minimum of 6200 
km to a maximum of 7700 km depending on 
the direction of launch. These ranges are not 
sufficient to hit any major city in the continental 
USA which are located over 9000 km away. 
However the range of the missile is adequate 
for it to reach targets in Alaska. The Unha 
3 missile therefore does pose a threat to the 
United States
Though the launch has failed the results 
of this exercise can be matched to the orbital 
elements realized by North Korea if and when 
they launch a satellite into a similar orbit. The 
extent to which the achieved orbit parameters 
meet those of a near perfect 500 km circular 
orbit would provide some insight into North 
Korean capabilities in both the missile and 
space domains.
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A major topic that grabbed  international 
media attention recently related to  North 
Korea’s attempted launch of a 100 kg satellite 
into a 500 km polar orbit.  This launch was 
North Korea’s fourth attempt to put a satellite 
into earth orbit.1 Three other attempts in 1999, 
2006 and 2009 all ended in failure.2 According 
to North Korea the current launch is a part of the 
country’s plans to use space for developmental 
purposes. 
North Korea’s announcement evoked 
widespread concern and condemnation from all 
countries. North Korea’s neighbours especially 
Japan and South Korea were prepared to 
shoot down the launcher if it strayed into their 
territory.3 The US as well as Europe and a host of 
other countries including North Korea’s mentor 
China have condemned North Korea’s actions. 
Background
1  North Korean statements suggest that the satellite could even be in a sun synchronous orbit. The purpose of the 
mission appears to be remote sensing applications to manage various resources.
2   According to publicly available information the 1999 launch was based on a Nodong first stage, a Scud derived 
second stage and a small solid propellant third stage. The 2009 launcher was significantly different involving a 
new bigger 2.25 m liquid booster stage, a Nodong second stage and a small liquid propellant liquid stage. For 
a more detailed analysis of the 2nd launch and associated missile parameters see David Wright, “An Analysis of 
North Korea’s Unha - 2 Launch Vehicle”, Union of Concerned Scientists, March 30 2009.
3   The ability of any of the neighbouring countries to shoot down the missile in the boost phase or mid-course phase 
where the altitude is about 500 km is questionable.
4   For a historical perspective of development and motivation see Daniel A Pinkston, “The North Korean Ballistic 
Missile Programme”, February 2008 available from http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
5   A media team has already visited the site and there is a video on the net put out by BBC where engineers are seen 
working on the missile. Some images on the vehicle put out on the Internet are from this video. See http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-17650517
6  Nick Hansen, “Preparing for the April DPRK Launch: A timeline for the next three weeks”, http://38north.
org/2012/03/nhansen0329/
7  38 North, “ North Korea Begins Launch Pad Preparations for April Rocket Launch: A 38 North Exclusive”, 
http://38north.org/2012/03/tongchang0329/
There is international unanimity that the space 
launch was being used as a  legal cover for the 
development of a long range missile by North 
Korea.4
Unlike in the past where North Korea’s 
attempts at space launches have been carefully 
kept under wraps, there was some effort on the 
part of North Korea to share information on 
Unha 3 launch. A media team was taken to the 
launch site for a view of their launcher.5 The 
launch preparations were monitored by satellites 
and information was constantly updated by the 
international media.6 Launch coincided with the 
100th birth anniversary of North Korea’s founder 
president Kim Il Sung.7
Some investigators have critically exam-
ined the information put out by North Korea 
and other information coming out from the 
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media to assess the performance of North 
Korea’s launcher.8 These include mapping the 
impact zones where the spent first and second 
stages fall as notified by North Korea as well as 
a comparison between the 2009 failed Unha 2 
launch and the current Unha 3 launch.
The Launch of apriL 12 2012
North Korea carried out the launch on April 
12, 2012. According to NORAD the launch was 
unsuccessful and the first stage of the missile 
fell into the sea about 165 Km west of Seoul.9 
Another source based on South Korea’s tracking 
of the launch differs from this estimate of the 
impact point of the failed launcher. According 
to this source the failed rocket landed just a 
little bit away from the notified impact zone put 
out by North Korea for the first stage impact. 
This would suggest that the failure happened 
towards the end of the first stage operation.10
Figure 1 provides an overview of the 
information on the launch and where the 
missile fell into the sea. The differences between 
NORAD and South Korea on the impact location 
are clearly captured in this figure. If the NORAD 
data is more correct the impact happened about 
245 km south of the launch site. If the South 
Korean data is right the impact happened much 
further down south at about a distance of 410 
km from the launch pad. Since this is just a little 
bit above the front part of the impact zone for 
the first stage put out by North Korea (marked 
ABCD) this would imply that the failure occurred 
just before the burnout of the first stage. If the 
NORAD data is more correct the failure must 
have happened a few seconds earlier.11 This 
aspect will be touched upon later after we have 
run a trajectory that fits the missile path with the 
provided first and second stage impact points.
inpuTs for evaLuaTion of The Launch 
TrajecTory
Though the launch was a failure  it may be 
still worthwhile to find out what kind of a vehicle 
has been engineered by North Korea. It may also 
be important to know whether the inferences 
we make about North Korea’s capabilities are 
consistent with the visual and inferred evidence 
that has now become available. There is now 
a reasonable base of information and data on 
North Korea’s space launcher. The notification 
of the impact zones for the spent first and 
second stages provides some additional anchor 
points for fixing the parameters and trajectory 
of the space launch. As mentioned earlier some 
work along these lines is already going on. 
The International Strategic & Security Studies 
Programme (ISSSP) at the National Institute of 
Advanced Studies (NIAS) thought it worthwhile 
to investigate North Korea’s space launcher in 
some more detail to see whether we can come 
up with a more informed evaluation of North 
Korea’s capabilities and if possible make some 
predictions about the orbit of the satellite that 
8  David Wright has put out a number of interim reports on the launch of North Korea’s Unha 3 launch vehicle prior 
to the actual launch. These include David Wright “North Korea’s Launch: Threading the Needle”, April 1, 2012 
http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/20309447404/north-koreas-launch-threading-the-needle, and “A Comparison of 
North Korea’s Unha 2 and Unha 3”, April 8, 2011 http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/20730991602/a-comparison-
of-north-koreas-unha-2-and-unha-3
9 http://www.northcom.mil/News/2012/041212.html
10 Jonathan’s Space Report No. 657 http://www.planet4589.org/space/jsr/jsr.html
11 For the NORAD data to fit, the velocity of the missile at failure would be about 1.44 Km per second. For the South Ko-
rean data to be correct the velocity would be closer to the velocity required of the first stage of 2.1 Km per second. 
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North Korea would have put into space if the 
launch had been successful.
To carry out any analysis of the trajectory 
of a space launch the starting point has to be 
data on the various basic parameters of the 
launch vehicle.12 This starting point used for 
our analysis of the Unha 3 launch were the 
images available in the public domain of North 
Korea’s Unha 2 launcher used for the April 2009 
space effort. These images were used to make 
measurements of the different components 
of the missile. These measurements made in 
pixels were converted into physical lengths by 
making the assumption that the second stage 
of the Unha 2 launcher is a Nodong derivative 
whose diameter we had validated earlier 
as being close to 1.33 m. The procedures for 
converting these lengths into propellant and 
stage weights are reasonably well-known and 
the group at NIAS has used such approaches on 
Figure 1
12 These include data on propellant masses and structural weights of the different stages, the specific impulses of 
the propellant combinations used in each stage, information on the thrust of the rocket engines used in different 
stages as well as data on the weight of the payload.
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other similar studies.13  The image used to make 
the measurements is in Figure 2.
Based on the assumption that the second 
stage diameter is 1.33 m – a reasonable 
assumption since the second stage has to be a 
Nodong variant – the diameters of the booster 
stage and the third stage can be estimated as 
2.25 m and 1 m respectively. The tank lengths, 
which are important for determining the amount 
of propellant, are 12m, 6.5 m and 2.4 m for the 
first, second and third stages respectively.14 The 
overall length of the vehicle which includes the 
satellite works out to be about 28 m.
Annexure 1 provides the details of these 
weight estimates for the different stages based 
on our image measurements. Our estimates 
are also compared with the estimates put out 
David Wright after North Koreas launch of Unha 
2 in 200915. Our estimate of the weight of the 
first stage at 56.5 tonnes is lower than Wright’s 
estimate of about 66 tonnes. Our estimate of the 
second stage mass is 10.2 tonnes. This matches 
well with Wright’s estimate of 10.1 tonnes. Our 
estimate of the third stage mass is 1.450 tonnes 
as compared to Wright’s estimate of 1 tonne. Our 
analysis assumes the payload shroud mass as 400 
kg (Wright’s value) and a satellite mass of 100 
kg. Following Wright our trajectory also assumes 
that the shroud is jettisoned at 180 seconds after 
liftoff during the second stage burn.
As we were progressing with our work 
some more information on North Korea’s space 
launcher became available. Based on this 
Wright has made available a comparison of the 
launcher used in 2009 with the 2012 launcher. 
This figure (Figure 3) is reproduced from 
Wright.16 As we can see there is an almost perfect 
match between the two images. In the second 
image some people are seen working on the 
missile. There is also another image available 
of the satellite part of the missile enabling a 
comparison of the diameters of the second and 
third stages.17 These images are consistent with 
a 1m diameter third stage, a 1.33 m diameter 
second stage and a 2.25 to 2.35 m diameter of 
13 S.Chandrashekar et al, “An Assessment of Pakistan’s Ballistic Missile Programme - Technical and Strategic Capabil-
ity”, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Report No. R 5-06, 2006. 
14 This is based on the assumption that all three stages use liquid propellants.
15 See Reference 2 p7
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the first stage. Therefore using an image of the 
earlier Unha 2 launch (Figure 2) to size the 
current launcher is consistent with the visual 
evidence.
simuLaTing The TrajecTory of The unha 3
We will use the launcher parameters 
derived from our measurements of the Unha 
2 launcher as the baseline for computing the 
trajectory. Using the information on the impact 
zones of the spent first and second stages of the 
launch we will try to model the actual trajectory 
that North Korea may choose to launch a 100 kg 
satellite into a 500 km near polar orbit.
The coordinates for the impact area of the 
spent first and second stages are available.18 The 
midpoint of the impact area of the first stage 
is 35 33 47 North Latitude and 124 41 23 E 
Longitude and the midpoint of the impact area 
of the second stage is 17 16 23.5 North Latitude 
and 124 17 50.25 E Longitude respectively. These 
midpoints are located at distances of 456 km and 
2490 km from the launch site respectively. These 
midpoints will be used to shape and fine tune the 
trajectory of the Unha 3 launcher.
Using the baseline configuration derived 
from the images and some assumptions on 
thrust and specific impulses based on empirical 
knowledge and evidence available in the public 
domain we will run our trajectory model and 
shape the cutoff velocities at the burnout of 
the first and second stages so that the spent 
Figure 3
18 See Reference 8
Unha-2 (April 2009) Unha-3 (April 2012)
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stages land reasonably close to the midpoint 
of the impact areas specified by North Korea. 
From this trajectory of the first two stages of 
the launch we will then proceed to shape the 
trajectory of the third stage so as to put a 100 kg 
satellite into a 500 km near polar orbit.19
The initial pitch angle of the missile after 
liftoff as well as the azimuth were varied so 
that the impact points of these stages was close 
to the midpoint of the zones notified by North 
Korea. Through a process of iteration 
we also determined that the weight of 
the third stage had to increase by about 
500 kg for the impact zone criterion to 
be met by the launcher. An initial pitch 
angle of 89.20 degrees20 with an azimuth angle 
of 171 degrees provides a reasonable fit for 
the first stage and second stage impact zones 
respectively.  The impact point for the first 
stage from our trajectory is shown in 
Figure 1. The impact point for the spent first 
stage from our trajectory simulation lies close 
to the point F in the figure. This is located to 
the right of the midpoint of the impact zone 
and almost at the edge of this zone but still well 
away from the South Korean coast. The impact 
point of the failed launch as per information put 
out by NORAD and South Korea respectively are 
also shown.
firsT sTage faiLure of unha 3
Since we now have a trajectory for the 
first stage splash down we can try and make 
some inferences about the failure of the first 
stage. If the information put out by NORAD is 
correct the impact of the first stage which failed 
occurred downrange at a distance of 245 km 
downrange of the launch site. To achieve this 
range the launcher when it failed must have been 
travelling close to about 1.44 km per second. 
From our trajectory model this would 
have happened at an altitude of 45 km 
and about 92 seconds after liftoff.
If the South Korean estimate of the impact 
of the first stage is used the impact happens 
at a distance of about 410 km down range 
of the launch site. Since this is only about 50 
kilometers away from the midpoint of the 
projected impact zone specified by North Korea 
the failure must have happened just before the 
burnout of the first stage at a velocity close 
to about 1.9 to 2 Km per second. From our 
trajectory model the failure must have 
occurred at an altitude of 66 km and 
between 105 and 107 seconds after 
launch. This failure seemed to have happened 
just before the burnout of the first stage. If the 
South Korean data is correct the failure could 
have taken place close to the separation of the 
first and second stages.
In either case as pointed out by Wright 
the failure happened well after the maximum 
dynamic pressure point indicated as Qmax in 
the technical literature where the vehicle goes 
through the regime of maximum stress.21 The 
problem does not appear to be a structural 
19 North Korea’s spokesman and press releases also talk of a sun synchronous orbit with an altitude of 500 km. This 
may require an additional maneuver of the 3rd stage before the coasting and ignition of the third stage. Our initial 
focus is an orbit without this additional maneuver.
20 A vertical liftoff has a pitch angle of 90 degrees. This has to be pitched down to reach different targets. A pitch 
down from 90 degrees to 89.20 degrees will result in the first stage impacting the sea at a distance of 456 km 
down range of the launch site.
21 The Qmax or the maximum stress regime for this launcher with our trajectory occurs at an altitude of 11 km and 
a velocity of 507 metres per second. The failure happened well after crossing this threshold.
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breakup problem arising out of this event. We 
can also see from Figure 1 that the burnout 
of the second stage happens well before the 
impact of the spent first stage
achieving orbiT   - unha 3 
After matching the impact points and the 
velocities of the first stage and second stage 
we then went on to fit the trajectory that 
would put the third stage and the satellite 
into a 500 km near circular orbit. Since the 
velocity after second stage burnout is known 
we can size the third stage suitably so that it 
can provide the velocity required to achieve a 
circular 500 km orbit. These revised parameters 
of our configuration which are modified from 
our original values are in Annexure 2. The 
second and third stages differ somewhat from 
our starting configuration.22 These changes 
have come about in trying to fit the vehicle 
parameters with the splashdown points of the 
first and second stages as well as to provide the 
required additional velocity that the third stage 
should provide to put the satellite into orbit. In 
order to achieve a 500 km circular orbit after the 
burnout of the second stage the launch vehicle 
has to carry out a pitch down maneuver, coast for 
a certain time period and somewhere near the 
highest point of its trajectory which should be 
close to 500 km, fire the third stage motor when 
the local velocity vector is perpendicular to the 
radius vector. Such an operation will move the 
third stage close to the 500 km required orbit. 
Through an iterative process of changing the 
pitch down maneuvering angle after the second 
stage burnout and varying the coasting period 
we were finally able to achieve a 506 km by 638 
km orbit – which is fairly close to the 500 km 
circular orbit specified by the North Koreans.23 
Figure 4 which is a plot of the vehicle velocity 
versus range for the three stages provides an 
overview of the launch from liftoff.
A more detailed time line of events based 
on the trajectory run is provided as Annexure 3. 
A brief description of the salient elements of the 
trajectory is provided below. 
Five seconds after a vertical liftoff the 
launch vehicle pitches down to 89.20 degrees 
and heads almost south at an azimuth of 171 
degrees with respect to the launch site location. 
The first stage burns for a little over 108 
seconds and at burnout the launcher achieves 
a velocity of 2105 meters per sec at an altitude 
of 71 km. The first stage separates out and falls 
downrange of the launch site at a distance of 
457 km at a point close to the point F marked 
in Figure 1
The second stage ignites immediately after 
the first stage burnout and propels the rocket 
to an altitude of 314 km and a velocity of 4199 
meters per second. The second stage burns for 
about 104 seconds. The shroud protecting the 
satellite is released 180 seconds after liftoff at 
about the midpoint of the second stage burn. 
The second stage separates and falls downrange 
of the launch site at a distance of 2475 km. The 
second stage impacts the ground after 1258 
seconds well after the satellite has been injected 
into orbit. The impact is at 17.4 degree latitude 
and 124.18 degree longitude well within the 
22 There is an increase of about 500 kg needed to the third stage to account for the impact zones of the first and 
second stages. A large part of this increase is the amount of propellant needed in the third stage to provide the 
additional velocity to put the satellite into orbit.
23 Even a small change in velocity could create an elliptical rather than a circular orbit. The closer the achieved orbit 
is to a circular orbit of 500 km altitude the more precise would the injection.
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Figure 4
Figure 5
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second stage impact zone notified by North 
Korea.
After the second stage burnout the launcher 
performs a further pitch down maneuver to 
29.75 degrees with respect to the launch site 
and then coasts for a period of 222 seconds. 
432 seconds after liftoff the third stage ignites 
and burns for about 44 seconds. At burnout the 
third stage with the satellite has a velocity of 
7638 meters per second enough to put it into 
orbit. The satellite is injected into earth orbit 
at an altitude of 506.6 km at a location with 
Latitude 28.902 N and Longitude of 124.954. 
The injection happens at a distance of 1196 
Figure 6
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km from the launch site. Figure 5 depicts the 
overall sequence of the firing of the three stages 
in terms of a velocity range profile.
The overall trajectory and the 
major events in the trajectory are seen 
in geographic detail in Figure 6 using 
Google Earth. The injection of the satellite 
happens about 320 km off the China coast 
between Ningbo and Fujian. The satellite 
passes about 340 km east of Taiwan as it 
goes on to complete its first orbit.
posT injecTion orbiT
Our trajectory model allows us to continue 
to track the satellite position and velocity even 
after injection. This data can be exported into 
Google Earth also. Figure 7 provides this orbit as 
it seen from over the South Pole. From this image 
we can predict the inclination approximately.24 
The inclination of the orbit as obtained from this 
Google Earth Projection is about 87 degrees. 
The altitude of the satellite increases slowly 
after injection till the apogee height of 638 km 
Figure 7
24 This is the point where the two tracks of the orbit that are seen in the image intersect
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is reached. This occurs about 3274 seconds 
after launch at 34.065 S Latitude and 67.095 
W Longitude. Figure 8 provides the altitude 
variation of the achieved orbit with time. We 
can see that the apogee is about 638 km and the 
perigee about 506 km. The approximate period 
of the satellite orbit is 95.93 minutes.
The KepLerian orbiTaL eLemenTs of The 
unha 3 Launch
To check the validity of our trajectory and 
orbit model we converted the orbital parameters 
into Keplerian orbital elements. Since Keplerian 
elements need an inertial frame of reference 
our ECEF rotating frame of reference had to be 
converted back into an Earth Centre Inertial (ECI) 
frame of reference. For any point in the orbit the 
conversion into Keplerian elements should give 
the same values for the various orbital elements 
except for some small second order effects.
The following are the major orbital 
elements for any elliptical orbit around 
the earth
Semi-major axis measured in •	
Kilometers and represented by symbol 
“a” which is half the value of the major 
axis of the elliptical orbit.
Eccentricity is a measure of the •	
deviation of the orbit from a circular 
orbit denoted by “e”.
Inclination measured “•	 i” in degrees 
is the angle between the equatorial 
plane of the earth and the orbital 
plane of the satellite.
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crosses the equatorial plane as it 
moves from south to north
Argument of the perigee “•	 ω” is the 
angular distance between the Right 
Ascension point of the satellite as it 
crosses the equator and the perigee 
of the orbit 
Time from perigee passage denoted •	
by “τ” is the time elapsed from the 
last perigee point.
Perigee, apogee as well as period of •	
the orbit are other parameters derived 
from these elements
We carried out these conversions at 
different locations within the achieved orbit. 
These conversions do provide a stable and 
relatively invariant set of orbital elements for 
these locations validating our trajectory and 
orbit model. Table 1 provides the realized 
Keplerian orbital elements at different points in 
the orbit. As we can see they are consistent and 
fairly close to each other. 
From Table 1 we can see that the orbital 
elements are consistent for these various 
locations in the orbit. An orbit with perigee of 
506 km, an apogee of 638 km, an inclination of 
87.050 degrees and a period very close to 96 
minutes describes this particular orbit.
This is only one of the many possible orbits 
for the Unha 3 launch. Even after restricting 
the set of possible orbits through the impact 
point constraints on the launch there are many 
possible trajectories. If and when North Korea 
conducts another launch we could verify to 
what extent these projections hold. In the ideal 
case where North Korea can control the injection 
parameters very closely the orbit would be very 
close to a 500 Km circular orbit. The extent to 
which the achieved orbit meets this ideal would 
give us some idea of North Korea’s capabilities 
in this difficult and arduous technology.
The Unha 3 Performance as a Long 
Range Missile
One of the major concerns expressed 
by the international community in response 
to North Korea’s announcement to launch a 
satellite was that it was cover for achieving Long 
Range Missile Capability. The US is particularly 
concerned that this Satellite Launch Vehicle 
with some minor modifications could pose 
Table 1
Orbital Elements Derived From Different Locations in Orbit
Orbital Parameter Location 1 Location 2 Location 3
Time since launch (seconds) 1064 sec 3864 sec 6064 sec
Semi- major axis “a” (Km) 6943.236 Km 6943.18 Km 6953.152 Km
Eccentricity “e” 0.009499 0.009587 0.009496
Orbit inclination “i” (degrees) 87.050 deg. 87.050 deg. 87.050 deg. 
Right Ascension of Ascending Node Ω	(degrees) 308.578 deg. 308.578 deg. 308.577 deg.
Argument of the perigee “ω” (degrees) 145.755 deg. 145.827 deg. 145.812 deg.
Time since Perigee Passage “τ” (seconds) 394.360 sec 395.237 sec 395.053 sec
Perigee altitude (Km) 506.280 Km 506.177 Km 506.219 Km
Apogee altitude (Km) 638.192 Km 638.196 Km 638.084 Km
Period (minutes) 95.93328 min 95.93227 min 95.93153 min
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a threat to some if not all parts of the United 
States. To check the validity of this assertion we 
also ran a missile trajectory for the Unha 3 with 
a 1000 Kg payload.25 Table 2 provides details of 
the performance of the missile launched from 
its current launch site (39.66 N 124.705 E) in 
different directions with a nuclear payload of 
1000 Kg.
From Table 2 we can see that the range of 
the Unha 3 if used as a missile will be between 
6200 to about 7700 Km depending on the 
direction of launch.
Distances from the launch site to the 
major US cities of San Francisco, New York and 
Washington are about 9000 Km, 10900 Km 
and 11000 Km respectively. These are all well 
beyond the maximum range of the Unha 3 and 
therefore do not pose a threat to the majority of 
the US states.
However the Unha 3 could reach most 
parts of Alaska with a 1000 kg payload. At an 
azimuth of about 36.5 degrees (launch in a 
North-eastern direction) the maximum range of 
the Unha 3 missile would be about 7300 Km 
putting all of Alaska within reach.  Anchorage 
which is about 6000 km from the launch site can 
be comfortably reached.  The Unha 3 does 
pose a threat to Alaska and therefore to 
the United States.
concLusions
Though North Korea has failed 
for the fourth time in attempting a 
satellite launch there is now enough 
information to evaluate the space 
launcher performance assuming that 
the launch was successful. Based 
on the notified impact zones for the 
first and second stages this analysis 
works out a possible trajectory for the 
launch attempt. It also provides the 
details of the orbit arising from such 
a launch. The validity of the analysis 
and the predictions will be known if 
and when North Korea repeats the 
effort and places a satellite in orbit. 
The range of the Unha 3 launcher if 
used as a missile cannot reach the 
continental United States. It can 
however comfortably reach all parts 
of Alaska and therefore does pose a 
threat to the US.
25 This is based on the assumption that a nuclear weapon and other elements to go with it in a warhead can be built 
within a 1000 Kg payload.
Table 2









39.66 N 124.705 E 1000 Kg Due North 0 degrees 6766 Km
39.66 N 124.705 E 1000 Kg Due East 90 degrees 7726 Km
39.66 N 124.705 E 1000 Kg Due South 180 degrees 6787 Km
39.66 N 124.705 E 1000 Kg Due West 270 degrees 6180 Km
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26 See Reference 2 p 7
Annexure 1
Table 3
Missile Parameters Used First Set
Parameter
Our Estimates from 
Image
David Wright 2009 
Launch Estimates26
Stage 1
Propellant mass 1st stage kg 49731 60000
inert mass stage 1 kg 6781 5900
Stage mass kg 56512 65900
Fuel fraction 0.88 0.91
Thrust Newtons 1145654 1097600
Isp vac sec 255 252
Burn time computed sec 108.59 120
Cross section Area sq m. 3.98 NA
Stage 2
Propellant mass stage 2 kg 8695 9000
Inert mass stage 2 kg 1534 1100
Stage mass kg 10230 10100
Fuel fraction 0.85 0.81
Thrust Newtons 210000 206010
Isp vac sec 255 255
Burn time computed sec 103.58 110
Cross sectionArea sq m 1.39 NA
Stage 3
Propellant mass stage 3 kg 1178 800
Inert mass stage 3 kg 276 200
Stage mass Kg 1455 1000
Fuel fraction 0.81 0.8
Thrust Newtons 93000 52920
Isp vac sec 265 270
Burn time computed sec 33 40
Cross section Area sq. m. 0.79 NA
Other Elements
Satellite mass kg 100 100
Shroud mass kg 400 400
Shroud release sec after liftoff 180 180
Lift off weight Kg 68697 77500
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Annexure 2
Table 4
Final Values Used for Trajectory
Parameter Final Values used for trajectory
Stage 1
Propellant mass 1st stage kg 49731
Inert mass stage 1 kg 6781
Stage mass kg 56512
Fuel fraction 0.88
Thrust Newtons 1144002
Isp vac sec 255
Burn time computed sec 108.74
Area of cross section sq m 3.98
Stage 2
Propellant mass stage 2 kg 8695
Inert mass stage 2 kg 1784
Stage mass kg 10479
Fuel fraction 0.83
Thrust Newtons 210000
Isp vac sec 255
Burn time computed sec 103.58
Area of cross section sq m 1.39
Stage 3 
Propellant mass stage 3 kg 1600
Inert mass stage 3 kg 354




Burn time computed sec 44
Area of cross section sq m 0.79
Other Elements
Satellite mass kg 100
Shroud mass kg 400
Shroud release sec 180
Lift off weight Kg 69445
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Annexure 3
Table 5










0 Vertical Lift off 0 0 0
5 sec Pitch Down 0.086 0 0.035
51 sec Maximum Q 11.13 2.17 0.507
109 sec Burn out stage 1 71.19 29.8 2.105
109 sec Ignition stage 2 71.19 29.8 2.105
180 sec Shroud separation 223.642 125.70 3.112
212 sec Stage 2 Burnout 314.019 191.705 4.199
212 sec Pitch down & coast 314.019 191.705 4.199
433 sec 3rd Stage Ignition 503.667 983.167 3.792
478 sec Orbit injection 506.561 1196 7.638
3272 sec Apogee of orbit 638.216 18800 7.493
6155 sec Perigee of orbit 506.221 2210 7.637


